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EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER 
OPERATIONS:  CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY 
CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER? 
Eric Lorber! 
On March 19, 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) 
launched strike aircraft and tomahawk cruise missiles against Libya in the 
opening phases of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the military intervention meant 
to stem Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s attacks on Libya’s civilian population.1  
The purpose of these initial strikes was to destroy Libya’s command and 
control facilities and its air defense network so that allied warplanes could fly 
uncontested through Libyan airspace and attack marauding government 
forces at will.2  This strategy—seizing air superiority in the early stages of a 
military conflict and then proceeding to attack the enemy’s ground forces 
and command systems—has been a hallmark of U.S. military operations in 
the post-Cold War era.3 
Behind the scenes, however, the Obama administration and Pentagon 
officials considered heavily modifying this battle-tested approach with a 
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 1 See Liz Sly, Greg Jaffe, and Craig Whitlock, U.S. and European officials say initial assault on 
Gaddafi’s forces “very effective”; Libyan leader pledges “long, drawn-out war”, WASH. POST (Mar. 
21, 2011, 12:07 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/19/AR2011031903274_pf.html (detailing the initial reports of successful 
combat operations in Libya). 
 2 See Brad Knickerbocker, U.S. leads “Odyssey Dawn” initial attack on Libya, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Mar. 19, 2011, 7:19 PM), (“In essence, [the] attacks were meant to shape the 
battle space so that coalition aircraft from other countries can safely enforce the no-fly 
zone.”). 
 3 See MICHAEL R. GORDON & GENERAL BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’ WAR 205–23 
(1995) (illustrating the tension among U.S. generals during the first hours of the Persian 
Gulf War when the United States launched a large attack against an impressive Iraqi air 
defense network using stealth aircraft); David A. Fulghum, Fast Forward:  The Pentagon’s 
Force-Transformation Director Takes an Early Swipe at What Worked and What Didn’t in Iraq, 
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2003, at 34–35 (describing the U.S. attack on Iraqi air 
defenses during Operation Iraqi Freedom that effectively disabled Iraq’s ability to contest 
U.S. air superiority throughout the 2003 campaign). 
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radical, new addition:  offensive cyberattacks.4  In the lead-up to the March 
19 attack, the administration debated disabling and destroying the Libyan 
air defense network and command and control nodes through concerted 
computer attacks that would prevent Libyan radars from effectively tracking 
allied aircraft.5  During these discussions, the administration raised a 
number of questions without clear answers, most notably whether a 
cyberattack could trigger invocation of the requirements of the War Powers 
Resolution.6  Although ultimately deciding to rely on more traditional 
kinetic operations, the administration’s internal discussions highlight an 
emerging area of importance and uncertainty in both national security and 
the law:  what domestic legal rules do and should govern the use of offensive 
cyber operations (“OCOs”), and how do these new capabilities play into the 
long-standing debate over the proper balance between congressional and 
executive war-making power?7 
Yet a surprising amount of uncertainty exists as to which—if any—
domestic laws constrain the use of OCOs and how they fit into the 
congressional-executive balance.  As policymakers, scholars, and journalists 
have lamented, a coherent policy framework governing the use of OCOs 
does not exist and many questions remain unanswered.8  Would an attack 
 
 4 See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A1 (describing a debate within the Obama Administration as to 
the wisdom—and legality—of using cyberattacks in operations against Libya in 2011).  
For the purposes of this Comment, I define “cyberattacks” as “efforts to alter, disrupt, or 
destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them . . . .  
[E]ncompassing activities that range in target (military versus civilian, public versus 
private), consequences (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration 
(temporary versus long-term) . . . .”  Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks  and the Use of 
Force:  Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011) (arguing that, for 
the foreseeable future, the United States will have to operate in an international legal 
environment that is unclear regarding whether cyberattacks constitute a use of force). 
 5 Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 4. 
 6 See id.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006). 
 7 See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:  CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR (1990); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:  
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989); Robert H. Bork, 
Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 693 (1990); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV., Special Issue 1970, at 19; W. Michael 
Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq:  International Law and Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 
203 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More Unto the Breach”:  The War Powers Resolution 
Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 8 See Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for Commander, 
United States Cyber Command:  Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. 9 (Apr. 15, 
2010), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/04%20April/
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using cyber weapons trigger the requirements of the War Powers 
Resolution?9  Would OCOs be subject to reporting requirements under the 
Intelligence Authorization Act?10  Conversely, do cyber operations grant the 
executive branch another tool with which it can prosecute attacks but avoid 
reporting and responding to congressional inquiries?  These questions are 
largely unanswered both because the rise of OCOs is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and because much of the information about U.S. technical 
capability in this field is highly classified.11 
Yet addressing these questions is increasingly important for two reasons.  
First, as states such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States use these 
weapons now and likely will do so more in future conflicts, determining the 
domestic legal strictures governing their use would provide policymakers 
and military planners a better sense of how to operate in cyberspace.12  
Second, the possible employment of these tools adds yet another wrinkle to 
the battle between the executive and legislative branches over war-making 
authority.13  In particular, if neither the War Powers Resolution nor the 
Intelligence Authorization Act governs OCOs, the executive may be allowed 
to employ U.S. military power in a manner largely unchecked by 
congressional authority.14  As a result, the employment of these tools 
 
Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf [hereinafter Advance Questions] (“President Obama’s 
cybersecurity sixty-day study highlighted the mismatch between our technical capabilities 
to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies, and our civilian leadership is 
working hard to resolve the mismatch.”); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-
attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-
attacks] (discussing the so-far-unsuccessful attempts to establish a coherent legal 
framework governing offensive cyber operations). 
 9 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541a (2006) (“[T]he purpose [is] to . . . insure that the collective 
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances . . . .”). 
 10 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006) (regulating the use and reporting of covert action). 
 11 DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT:  REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934 (Nov. 2011), 
at 5 [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT] (responding to 
congressional inquiries as to how the Defense Department plans on using offensive cyber 
capabilities in future operations). 
 12 See infra Part I. 
 13 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 14 For example, if, in the case of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United States had decided to 
use cyberattacks to disable Libyan air defense systems, such an attack may not have 
triggered the reporting and removal requirements explicit in the War Powers Resolution.  
See infra Part IV.  Though the Obama Administration argued that its military activities in 
Libya did not constitute hostilities for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution—and 
therefore did not trigger its reporting requirements—if U.S. forces were actively engaged 
in combat for a longer period of time such that the activities did constitute hostilities, 
determining whether cyberattacks trigger the War Powers clock would become critical in 
establishing when the executive was required to report and remove troops absent 
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implicates—and perhaps problematically shifts—the balance between the 
executive’s commander-in-chief power15 and Congress’s war-making 
authority.16 
This Comment provides an initial answer to the question of whether 
current U.S. law can effectively govern the Executive’s use of OCOs.17  It 
explores the interaction between this new tool and the current statutory 
limits on presidential war-making authority, with a particular focus on 
whether the two current federal laws meant to restrict executive power in 
this field—the War Powers Resolution18 and the Intelligence Authorization 
Act19—apply to a wide range of potential offensive cyber operations 
undertaken by the executive branch.  Beyond suggesting that neither the 
War Powers Resolution nor the Intelligence Authorization Act can effectively 
regulate most types of offensive cyber operations, this Comment suggests 
that while marginally problematic for a proper balance of war-making power 
between the executive and legislative branches, this lack of oversight does 
not fundamentally shift the current alignment.  It does argue, however, 
that—given this lack of regulatory oversight—the President now has another 
powerful war-making tool to use at his discretion.  Finally, the Comment 
suggests that this lack of limitation may be positive in some ways, as laying 
down clear legal markers before having a developed understanding of these 
capabilities may problematically limit their effective use. 
This Comment proceeds by addressing these issues in five sections.  Part 
I introduces the recent increase in offensive cyber operations and 
capabilities, both by the United States and other countries.  It also discusses 
the underdeveloped nature of the law governing OCOs in the United States.  
Part II provides an overview of offensive cyber operations, specifically laying 
out a spectrum upon which different operations would fall (i.e., as stand-
 
congressional approval of the action.  Libya and War Powers:  Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Dep’t of State) [hereinafter Libya War Powers] (“[A] combination of four factors 
present in Libya suggests that the current situation does not constitute the kind of 
‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day automatic pullout 
provision.”). 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“Congress shall have power . . . To declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and 
Water . . . .”). 
 17 This Comment explicitly does not address current U.S. legislative efforts to craft a 
framework that protects the private sector from foreign cyberattacks.  See, e.g., 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 18 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006) (restricting the deployment of U.S. soldiers in major 
combat operations for extended periods of time without the consent of either the 
President or Congress). 
 19 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006). 
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alone operations or as a tactical supplement to major combat operations).  
Establishing this spectrum facilitates categorization of cyber operations and 
helps determine which domestic statutory framework would govern a 
particular type of operation. 
Part III examines cyber operations through the prism of the War Powers 
Resolution, noting that while the Resolution is likely constitutional, an 
analysis of its language, Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions 
interpreting it, and case law suggests that it does not cover the use of 
offensive cyberattacks even if used as part of major military campaigns.  Part 
IV examines whether the Intelligence Authorization Act provides Congress 
with regulatory power over stand-alone and covert operations, suggesting 
that, given its weak information-sharing requirements and substantially 
malleable language, the Act does not provide Congress with an effective 
regulatory mechanism.  Part V discusses the implications of this lack of 
federal statutory coverage, in particular suggesting both that these new types 
of capabilities do not represent a substantial shift in the balance of war-
making authority between the executive and the legislative branches and 
that, while critics lament the fact that it does not rein in presidential actions, 
the conclusion that it should is premature. 
I. DEVELOPING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES, UNDER-
DEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Over the past five years, offensive cyber operations have become an 
increasingly frequent element of, inter alia, major combat operations,20 
coercive diplomacy,21 and attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation.22  
 
 20 David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study:  Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J., Jan. 6, 2011, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008 (providing an in-
depth assessment of how the Russians utilized cyberattacks before the start of kinetic 
operations to make those operations substantially more effective). 
 21 Ian Traynor, Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia, GUARDIAN, May 17, 
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html.  On coercive 
diplomacy more generally, see Robert J. Art, Coercive Diplomacy:  What Do We Know?, in 
THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin eds., 
2003).  The academic literature on coercion theory is vast and spans many decades.  See, 
e.g., RICHARD K. BETTS, NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND NUCLEAR BALANCE (1987); ALEXANDER 
L. GEORGE, FORCEFUL PERSUASION:  COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 
(1991); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY:  THEORY AND PRACTICE (1974); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT (1980); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); GLENN H. SNYDER 
& PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS:  BARGAINING, DECISION MAKING, AND SYSTEM 
STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1977).  For more recent works that have made an 
important contribution to the theory and the analysis of the empirical record, see DANIEL 
BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF COERCION:  AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT (2002); KENNETH A. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY AND 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (2001). 
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During this period, they have received a great deal of attention as newly 
effective methods of waging war, and indeed the United States, concerned 
both with developing defensive measures against enemies employing these 
capabilities, as well as determining how it will use its own offensive 
capabilities, has begun organizing around the notion that offensive cyber 
operations will constitute an important component of future warfare.23  Yet 
during this time frame, despite the development and consideration of the 
employment of these capabilities, U.S. policymakers have been unable to 
effectively develop a legal framework for when they can and cannot be 
used.24  The following discussion details some of the most notable public 
instances of the employment of offensive cyber operations over the past half-
decade.  It also describes how many policymakers and military strategists 
believe that cyber operations will become even more important in future 
combat operations.  It then proceeds to discuss the comparatively 
underdeveloped legal rules and regulations governing the United States’ use 
of such weapons. 
A. Cyber Warfare Outside the U.S. Context 
In what some journalists called the “world’s first cyberwar,” hackers 
linked to the Russian government attacked Estonian government websites 
and infrastructure in April and May of 2007.25  In a series of attacks lasting 
approximately one month, Russian-linked hackers, responding to the 
removal of a Soviet statue in a port city, “came close to shutting down the 
country’s digital infrastructure, clogging the Web sites of the president, the 
prime minister, Parliament and other government agencies, staggering 
 
 22 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBERWAR:  THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 3–8 (2010) (suggesting that Israel took down Syrian 
air defenses with a cyberattack during its 2007 raid on Syria’s nuclear reactor). 
 23 Siobhan Gorman & Yochi Dreazen, Military Command Is Created for Cyber Security, WALL ST. 
J., June 24, 2009, at A6 (detailing the establishment of Cyber Command to conduct 
offensive and defensive cyber operations); see also Donna Miles, Gates Establishes New Cyber 
Subcommand, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (June 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54890 (announcing the 
establishment of CYBERCOM). 
 24 Stewart Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, Sept. 30, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial_of_service?page=0,0 
(detailing the various, inchoate attempts to rein in cyber operations with outdated legal 
concepts). 
 25 Steven Lee Myers, Estonia Computers Blitzed, Possibly by the Russians, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2007, at A8 (providing an early assessment of how Russian-linked hackers—despite the 
Kremlin’s denials—waged a cyber war against Estonia); Traynor, supra note 21; see also 
Jose Nazario, Estonian DDoS Attacks—A summary to date, ARBOR NETWORKS SEC. BLOG (May 
17, 2007), http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-
date/ (providing a detailed assessment of how Estonia’s networks were taken down). 
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Estonia’s biggest bank and overwhelming the sites of several daily 
newspapers.”26  The attackers used a network of “bots”—computers slaved to 
master servers and spread as widely as the United States and Vietnam—to 
overload Estonia’s networks and shut down its ability to process 
information.27  These Denial of Service (“DoS”) and Distributed Denial of 
Service (“DDoS”) attacks had a substantial effect on Estonia that went 
beyond making it impossible for Internet users to browse government 
websites; by attacking bank sites, the hackers were able to shut down online 
services and cause significant losses for financial firms.28  Though Russia 
denied any link to the hackers, many in the cyber community—as well as in 
Estonia—believed the Russian government was responsible.29  The incident 
raised two primary points of concern among national security officials and 
analysts around the world.  First, though cyberattacks to steal information 
have been occurring for a long time (popularly dubbed “cyber 
exploitation”),30 many thought this episode represented the first time a 
nation had employed a large-scale cyberattack to disable or destroy another 
country’s infrastructure.31  Second, compared to many other nations, experts 
considered Estonia to be particularly well prepared to deal with cyberattacks, 
as the government had teams and plans in place that actively confronted 
each intrusion throughout the episode.32 
However, the Estonian attacks represented only one type of OCO 
undertaken in the past five years and likely the least damaging to the 
intended target.33  In that case, though hackers were able to disrupt financial 
 
 26 Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at 1 (detailing the initial attacks and providing a more 
substantial overview of the Russian-linked campaign); see also ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS:  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14–35 (2010) (providing a 
comprehensive overview, including substantial background information, of the attacks on 
Estonia). 
 27 Landler & Markoff, supra note 26; John Robb, When Bots Attack, WIRED, Sept. 2007, at 166, 
167 (laying out hypothetical scenarios for how China could launch a major bot attack 
against the United States and effectively disrupt the U.S. economy). 
 28 Landler & Markoff, supra note 26, at A1. 
 29 Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Def. of Est., Remarks at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies:  Cyberspace: A New Security Dimension at Our Fingertips (Nov. 28, 
2007), available at http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-jaak-aaviksoo-minister-defense-
republic-estonia (suggesting that Russia was responsible for the coordinated attack). 
 30 See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Landler & Markoff, supra note 26. 
 32 See TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 24; Landler & Markoff, supra note 26; Newly Nasty, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 63 (suggesting that, following the mass-hacker attack against 
Estonia, most countries remained unprepared for this type of strike). 
 33 Interestingly, the damage of offensive cyber operations can spread far more broadly than 
their initial targets.  See John Bumgarner & Scott Borg, U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, 
Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of 2008, at 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-
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services and government websites, the long-term damage—to say nothing of 
the kinetic effects such as actual destruction—was limited.34  Other countries 
have begun to use OCOs in more complex ways, particularly in conjunction 
with military operations.  In 2008, during the Russian-Georgian war, the 
Russians—or Russian citizens operating with government approval—used 
denial of service attacks to disable government websites and prevent the 
Georgian authorities from providing information to the public.35  In 
addition, the attacks made it more difficult for the government to transmit 
data to international observers and convince other countries of the 
magnitude of the Russian military assault.36  The Russians also linked their 
OCOs with traditional kinetic operations for added effect; cyberattacks 
disrupted military communications between Georgian units and decreased 
the effectiveness of the Georgian defensive response.37  According to military 
analyst David Hollis:  “This appear[ed] to be the first case in history of a 
coordinated cyberspace domain attack synchronized with major combat 
actions in the other warfighting domains (consisting of Land, Air, Sea, and 
Space).”38  Further, analysts believe that this tight linkage between kinetic 
 
Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf (providing an in-depth examination of Russia’s use of 
cyber operations against Georgia and suggesting that the 2008 Russian attack on 
Georgian servers had long-term echoes, with disruptions hitting Twitter and Facebook 
worldwide in 2009 as a direct result of the attack).  This phenomenon of cyberattacks 
spreading more broadly than their intended targets is not limited to the Georgian case.  
See Robert McMillian, Was Stuxnet Built to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Program?, PCWORLD (Sept. 
21, 2010, 4:10 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/
205827/was_stuxnet_built_to_attack_irans_nuclear_program.html (suggesting that 
though the Stuxnet worm may have been created to attack centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz’s 
nuclear energy facility, it damaged a wide range of industrial targets in India and 
Indonesia as well). 
 34 TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 24–25. 
 35 Id. at 77–79; see also Noah Shachtman, Top Georgian Official:  Moscow Cyber Attacked Us—We 
Just Can’t Prove It, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009, 7:32 AM), http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2009/03/georgia-blames/ (detailing how, despite invading the country, the 
Russian government denied that it employed its offensive cyber weaponry against 
Georgia).  Others disagree with this portrayal.  For example, the U.S. Cyber 
Consequences Unit suggested, 
The cyber attacks against Georgian targets were carried out by civilians with little 
or no direct involvement on the part of the Russian government or military. . . .  
The organizers of the cyber attacks had advance notice of Russian military 
intentions, and they were tipped off about the timing of the Russian military 
operations . . . . 
  Bumgarner & Borg, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 36 TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 77–79. 
 37 Robert Haddick, This Week at War:  Lessons from Cyberwar I, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Jan. 28, 
2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/this_week_at_war_lessons_
from_cyberwar_i (suggesting that Russia effectively coordinated its diplomatic, military, 
and cyber strategy to bring a great deal of coercive power to bear on Georgia); Hollis, 
supra note 20, at 2–5. 
 38 Hollis, supra note 20, at 2. 
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and cyber operations will become standard operating protocol in future 
military operations.39 
In addition, the Israelis reportedly linked their cyber and kinetic 
operations—and plan to do so in the future—in conflicts against regional 
adversaries.  In 2007, the Israelis launched Operation Orchard, a strike 
against a purported nuclear reactor being built in Syria with North Korean 
help.40  Israeli aircraft penetrated Syrian airspace without detection or attack 
from Syria’s air defense network.41  Analysts believe that the Israelis were 
able to slip into Syrian airspace with non-stealthy aircraft due to a 
cyberattack—perhaps in the form of a kill switch that Israeli saboteurs 
placed inside electronics delivered to Syria—that disabled the air defense 
network.42  Given the success of this operation, and particularly the fact that 
no Israeli aircraft were lost, many analysts believe that the Israelis will use a 
similar strategy if they decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.43  The 
likelihood of future combatants deploying advanced cyberattacks alongside 
more traditional military forces is not limited to Israel and Russia.  Notably, 
the Chinese have developed extensive OCOs designed to slow down 
deployments of U.S. troops into the Pacific theater in case of a U.S.-Chinese 
 
 39 See, e.g., Ben Arnoldy, Cyberspace:  New Frontier in Conflicts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 
13, 2008, at 2 (arguing that Russia’s use of offensive cyber operations portends the future 
integration of this capability into combat operations). 
 40 Mark Heinrich, IAEA suspects Syrian nuclear activity at bombed site, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2010, 
4:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/18/us-nuclear-syria-iaea-idUSTRE
61H66320100218 (“[T]he International Atomic Energy Agency lent public support to 
Western suspicions that Israel’s target was a nascent nuclear reactor that Washington said 
was North Korean in design and geared to making weapons-grade plutonium.”). 
 41 See David A. Fulghum & Douglas Barrie, Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian 
mystery target, ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/
story?id=3702807&page=1#.UJFmC47mWwo (exploring the electronic technology behind 
Israel’s cyberattack which purportedly prevented advanced Syrian air defense systems 
from detecting inbound Israeli aircraft). 
 42 CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 22, at 3–8; Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (May 2008), http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-for-
the-kill-switch/0 (“Among the many mysteries still surrounding that strike was the failure 
of a Syrian radar—supposedly state-of-the-art—to warn the Syrian military of the 
incoming assault. . . . [Many] speculated that the commercial off-the-shelf 
microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden 
‘backdoor’ inside.”). 
 43 Eli Lake, Israel’s Secret Iran Attack Plan:  Electronic Warfare, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28 
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/16/israel-s-secret-iran-attack-plan-
electronic-warfare.html (detailing how Israel would use offensive cyber operations in 
future conflicts to attack not only Iran’s air defense networks, but also its “electric grid, 
Internet, cellphone [sic] network, and emergency frequencies for firemen and police 
officers”). 
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conflict and to reduce their effectiveness once deployed, principally by 
attacking U.S. communication nodes.44 
B. The United States and Offensive Cyber Capabilities 
While these countries have been developing offensive cyber capabilities, 
the United States arguably has “the world’s most powerful and sophisticated 
offensive cyberattack capability.”45  According to the former chief technology 
officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “[w]e have U.S. warriors in 
cyberspace that are deployed overseas” and “live in adversary networks.”46  
Indeed, the United States was responsible for one of the first cyberattacks, 
targeting the Soviet Union in 1982.47  Over the past decade, the United 
States has begun to devote an increasing amount of attention to defending 
against offensive cyber operations while developing its own offensive 
capabilities.48  In 2009, the United States set up Cyber Command 
(“CYBERCOM”), co-housed with the National Security Agency, to help 
secure U.S. systems from cyberattack.49  While initially billed as a way to 
better streamline the United States’ ability to defend itself against cyber 
operations, it quickly became apparent that a major mission of the new 
command was to develop and deploy offensive cyber weaponry across the 
globe.  Indeed, General Keith Alexander, the chief of Cyber Command and 
the director of the National Security Agency, has expressed a desire to have 
 
 44 See Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and 
Computer Network Exploitation, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, at 23–24 (2009) 
(describing China’s current doctrine and how it might be employed in a national conflict 
with the United States). 
 45 Jack Goldsmith, Can we stop the cyber arms race?, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2010, at A17. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS:  AN INSIDER’S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR (2004) 
(detailing a cyberattack on Soviet gas refining capabilities in 1982 which had substantial 
blowback effects by infecting and damaging non-targets). 
 48 CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 22. 
 49 Gorman & Dreazen, supra note 23, at A6 (detailing the establishment of CYBERCOM to 
conduct both offensive and defensive cyber operations); see also Miles, supra note 23 
(announcing the establishment of CYBERCOM).  Interestingly, CYBERCOM is tasked 
with defending military websites, whereas the Department of Homeland Security is tasked 
with defending civilian cyber infrastructure.  As a result, the United States civilian 
infrastructure is less prepared than the military infrastructure to defend against 
cyberattacks.  See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2010, at A7 (“[I]n testimony to Congress in September, [General Keith Alexander, head 
of Cyber Command] warned that Cyber Command could not currently defend the 
country against cyber-attack because it ‘is not my mission to defend today the entire 
nation.’  If an adversary attacked power grids, he added, a defensive effort would ‘rely 
heavily on commercial industry.’”). 
Jan. 2013] EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY 971 
 
“sufficient maneuvering room for his new command to mount what he has 
called ‘the full spectrum of operations’ in cyberspace.”50 
Since the creation of Cyber Command, U.S. offensive cyber capabilities 
have come into greater focus.51  Through leaks of classified information, 
U.S. journalists have provided the public with a glimpse of a number of 
offensive cyber operations conducted over a years-long time frame.  Most 
notably, in June 2012, New York Times reporter David Sanger revealed that 
the United States—collaborating with Israel—had launched an 
unprecedented, coordinated series of cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear 
program, code-named “Olympic Games.”52  Even after one of the core 
elements of Olympic Games, the Stuxnet virus, began affecting systems 
outside of Iran’s nuclear industry, the United States continued launching 
similar assaults against Iran.53  More recently, another computer program 
targeting Iran’s nuclear industry, the Flame virus, also became public.54  In 
contrast to Stuxnet, which attacked certain computer systems it infected, the 
United States and Israel jointly developed Flame to covertly steal key secrets 
about Iran’s nuclear program after infecting Iranian systems.55 
Despite these leaks of classified information, offensive cyber capabilities 
remain one of the U.S. government’s most closely-guarded secrets.  For 
example, in its recently released Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the 
Department of Defense did not mention its offensive capabilities.56  Further, 
in response to congressional questions during the debates over the 2011 
 
 50 Nakashima, supra note 49, at A1 (suggesting that “[o]ffensive actions could include 
shutting down part of an opponent’s computer network to preempt a cyber-attack against 
a U.S. target or changing a line of code in an adversary’s computer to render malicious 
software harmless.  They are operations that destroy, disrupt or degrade targeted 
computers or networks”). 
 51 Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon:  Cyber offense part of U.S. strategy, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2011, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/pentagon-cyber-offense-part-of-us-strategy/
2011/11/15/glQArEAIPN_story.html (“The Pentagon is prepared to launch cyberattacks 
in response to hostile actions that threaten the government, military or U.S. 
economy . . . .”). 
 52 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2012, at 1 [hereinafter Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran] 
(elaborating on how the United States and the Israelis co-developed a number of 
different viruses to both gather intelligence on—and disrupt—Iranian nuclear facilities). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller, & Julie Tate, U.S. and Israel created ‘Flame’, WASH. POST, 
June 20, 2012, at A1 (“The United States and Israel jointly developed a sophisticated 
computer virus nicknamed Flame that collected intelligence in preparation for cyber-
sabotage aimed at slowing Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon, according to 
Western officials with knowledge of the effort.”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 DEP’T OF DEF. STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011) (detailing how the U.S. 
government would develop robust defenses and partner with the private sector to assure 
integrity of its cyber systems). 
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National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense did not 
directly address—at least in an unclassified forum—the extent of U.S. 
offensive cyber capabilities, nor the policies governing them.57  However, it 
did reference that these capabilities exist:  “[T]he Department has the 
capability to conduct offensive operations. . . . DoD will conduct offensive 
cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and legal 
regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the 
law of armed conflict.”58 
These limited references to offensive cyber operations, including how 
existing legal principles may govern them, are becoming more frequent in 
public discussions, however.  For example, in its Cyberspace Policy Report, 
the Department of Defense indirectly alluded to such capabilities by briefly 
touching on the application of the War Powers Resolution to cyberspace:  
“Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces 
personnel into the area of hostilities.  Cyber operations may, however, be a 
component of larger operations that could trigger notification and 
reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.”59  Though not 
discussing specific U.S. policies or capabilities, such statements echo the 
idea—explored above in the Russian, Israeli, and Chinese cases—that the 
United States is actively planning to utilize cyber operations in future 
conflicts.  And in one of the most transparent discussions of U.S. OCOs to 
date, General Alexander appeared before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in 2010 and answered questions about CYBERCOM’s mission, 
including its offensive activities.60  In response to advance questions by 
senators, he noted that CYBERCOM would serve “as the focal point for 
deconfliction of DOD offensive cyberspace operations.”61  More recently, in 
the 2012 House Conference Report for the National Defense Authorization 
Act, Congress specifically recognized U.S. offensive cyber capabilities: 
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and 
upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in 
cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to (1) the 
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for 
kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War 
Powers Resolution. . . .62 
 
 57 DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2–9. 
 58 Id. at 5. 
 59 Id. at 9. 
 60 Advance Questions, supra note 8 (suggesting that the United States is developing, and will 
deploy, greater offensive cyber capabilities in the future). 
 61 Id. at 1. 
 62 H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, at 255–56 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).  See also id. at 686 (“[T]here is a 
lack of historical precedent for what constitutes traditional military activities in relation to 
cyber operations and [] it is necessary to affirm that such operations may be conducted 
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Further, as discussed, in the recent Libyan intervention, the Obama 
administration has actively considered using its offensive cyber capabilities in 
conjunction with kinetic operations.63  The instances above suggest that 
many countries—the United States among them—are developing and 
deploying offensive cyber capabilities both as tools of deterrence and for 
war-fighting purposes.  Further, these comments and documents suggest 
that in the United States, policymakers are beginning to grapple with how 
these new technologies may fall under current legal regimes and potentially 
alter the war-making balance between Congress and the President. 
C. The United States, Offensive Cyber Capabilities, and Legal Gaps 
While a large body of scholarship speaks to the question of whether—
and how—international law governs the use of cyber weapons, few scholars 
have addressed the issue of whether U.S. domestic law provides guidance as 
to when and how these tools can be employed and whether Congress 
currently has the ability to effectively regulate their use.  Since the late 
1990s, scholars and practitioners have grappled with a number of issues 
related to whether cyberattacks constitute armed attacks, justify self-defense, 
or create national obligations to assist other countries under cyberattack.64  
In particular, international law scholars have considered whether offensive 
cyberattacks constitute the use of armed force under the UN Charter.65  
They have suggested that such conclusions should be determined by the 
damage inflicted.66  Other scholars have looked to past instances of actions 
short of the use of kinetic force, such as economic sanctions, to argue that 
cyberattacks likely constitute acts of aggression.67  Likewise, academics, 
 
pursuant to the same policy, principles, and legal regimes that pertain to kinetic 
capabilities.”). 
 63 Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 4. 
 64 DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS (May 1999), at 8–10, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/
dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf (arguing that cyberattacks may not constitute armed attacks 
under international law); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force 
in International Law:  Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 
885 (1999) (“This Article explores the acceptability under the jus ad 
bellum . . . [c]oncluding that traditional applications of the use of force prohibition fail to 
adequately safeguard shared community values threatened by [computer network 
attacks].”). 
 65 See, e.g., Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 73 (2002). 
 66 See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Laws of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87 
(2010) (concluding that the question of whether cyberattacks are considered “armed 
attacks” in international law should be answered with an eye as to their negative effects). 
 67 See, e.g., Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. AND POL. 57 (2001) (suggesting that economic sanctions are not as 
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examining similar questions, have asserted either that international law 
cannot—as currently understood—effectively deal with these issues, or that, 
for the foreseeable future, such questions will not be clarified.68  Others have 
explored when cyberattacks can justify legitimate acts of self-defense.69  
Beyond the academy, policymakers have also actively discussed whether and 
how international law governs the use of offensive cyber operations.70 
While many in the public sphere have paid a great deal of attention to 
the legality of offensive cyber operations, far less attention has been devoted 
to how domestic law interacts with the United States’ employment of these 
capabilities.  Indeed, policymakers have repeatedly noted “the mismatch 
between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing 
laws and policies.”71  Over the past few years, studies have suggested that the 
United States has not developed such a legal framework and that whether 
current U.S. law—such as the War Powers Resolution—can regulate OCOs 
remains under-analyzed.72  While some argue that attempting to develop 
such a framework will severely hamper the United States’ ability to effectively 
conduct offensive cyber operations in future conflicts,73 most analysts agree 
that “[t]oday’s policy and legal framework for guiding and regulating the 
U.S. use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain.”74  
To this point, most of the debate as to the legality of these operations has 
remained behind government doors.75  Indeed, until very recently, scholars 
 
damaging as cyberattacks and merely represent a cessation of trade with a target country, 
not an active attack on that country’s infrastructure). 
 68 Duncan Hollis, New Tools, New Rules:  International Law and Information Operations, 
(Temple Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-15), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009224 (asserting that the current 
system of international law as applied to information operations such as cyberattacks  
“suffers from several, near-fatal conditions”); Waxman, supra note 4. 
 69 Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure:  A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 208–09 (2002) (suggesting that 
offensive cyber operations constitute a use of force). 
 70 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. 
ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 241–82 (William A. Owens, Kenneth 
W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (providing a wide-ranging overview of how different 
elements of international law might apply to cyberattacks). 
 71 Advance Questions, supra note 8, at 9. 
 72 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 233 (“This report does not seek to resolve 
this controversy [as to whether the War Powers Resolution governs offensive cyber 
operations], but observes that notions of cyberconflict and cyberattack will inevitably 
cause more confusion and result in less clarity.”). 
 73 See Stewart Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial_of_service?page=0,0 
(detailing the various, inchoate attempts to rein in cyber operations with outdated legal 
concepts). 
 74 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 4. 
 75 See Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-attacks, supra note 8, at A1. 
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have not paid substantial attention to these issues.  To date, only a few 
articles,76 blog postings,77 and a National Resource Council report78 have 
delved into this issue in any detail. 
This lack of attention creates a series of problems in determining 
whether and how to regulate these operations.  Most notably, before even 
addressing whether a new framework should be developed, the question 
arises as to whether the current domestic legal framework can govern the 
employment of these capabilities.  Although many policymakers have 
suggested the current framework cannot govern OCOs, this question 
remains to be closely examined and argued.  Only if the existing framework 
is found inadequate should legal scholars and practitioners design a new 
legal framework.  Indeed, if, as Matthew Waxman argues, “strategy is a . . . 
driver of legal evolution,”79 then new legal mechanisms may be required to 
ensure proper limitations on the executive’s war-making abilities. 
Though a full accounting of the potential domestic legal mechanisms 
governing the use of offensive cyber weapons is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, a first step in determining whether the current legal framework 
can be effective, at least partially, in governing the uses of these new 
weapons is to examine whether an appropriate procedural system exists as to 
regulate when and how they are employed.  Though not delving into 
specifics about the use of these weapons, an operative, procedural 
framework that allows other governmental branches to review, understand, 
and potentially check the uses of these weapons provides an initial move 
towards their effective regulation.  Though it may not be sufficient to fully 
clarify when and how the use of offensive cyber weapons may be legal, such a 
system at least would allow for oversight and hold the promise of helping 
policymakers better understand the conditions under which they can 
lawfully use these tools. 
 
 76 See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 
Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539 (2012) (discussing how Congress, through the 
Intelligence Authorization Act, may be able to rein in the executive’s use of cyber 
capabilities); Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 155 (2010) (describing the lack of sufficient federal laws governing cyber 
operations, particularly in the relationship between the legislative and executive). 
 77 Jack Goldsmith, Quick Thoughts on the USG’s Refusal to Use Cyberattacks in Libya, LAWFARE 
(Oct. 18, 2011, 7:48 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/quick-thoughts-on-the-
aborted-u-s-cyberattacks-on-libya/ (discussing why the Obama Administration decided not 
to use cyber warfare at the commencement of the Libya campaign); Julian Ku, Do 
Cyberattacks Fall Under the War Powers Act?, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 18, 2011, 8:15 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/10/18/do-cyberattacks-fall-under-the-war-powers-act/ 
(raising the question in relation to the Libya case but not answering it). 
 78 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70. 
 79 Waxman, supra note 4, at 425. 
976 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
To this end, this Comment examines the two primary statutory tools 
through which Congress has tried to regulate executive military action:  the 
War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act.  There are 
two reasons to focus on these statutes.  First, they apply to instances in which 
offensive cyber weapons will most likely be employed outside of surveillance 
and espionage actions:  covert actions to disable and disrupt adversary 
systems and capabilities, and overt actions taken in conjunction with kinetic 
operations to degrade an adversary’s ability to effectively conduct combat 
operations.  Second, they are the primary means through which Congress 
has attempted to constrain the President’s exercise of his constitutional 
Commander-in-Chief function.80  Historically, and particularly since 1970, 
Congress has been reluctant to use its primary power, the power of the 
purse, to defund military activities, utilizing it only a handful of times.81  As 
recent controversies over funding for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 
the intervention in Libya illustrate, threatening to defund ongoing military 
operations is politically delicate and many legislators prefer to avoid taking 
such action.82  Before proceeding to analyze OCOs through the prism of 
these two statutes, however, sharpening our understanding of the different 
types of OCOs is necessary. 
II. TYPOLOGIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS 
Cyberattacks are “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information or programs on them . . . [,] encompassing 
activities that range in target (military versus civilian, public versus private), 
consequences (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration 
(temporary versus long-term).”83  While this definition provides broad 
 
 80 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 81 RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20775, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF 
FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS 
DEPLOYMENTS (2001) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS 
SINCE 1970] (detailing congressional actions to cut off funding under the Constitution 
for U.S. troops abroad). 
 82 See Matthew Yglesias, Lack of Congressional Authorization for Use of Force is an Abdication of 
Responsibility, Not a Power Grab, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Mar. 20, 2011, 6:30 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/03/20/200278/lack-of-congressional-
authorization-for-use-of-force-is-an-abdication-of-responsibility-not-a-power-grab/ (“Even 
if you completely leave the declaration of war business aside, congress’ [sic] control over 
the purse strings still gives a determined congressional majority ample latitude to restrain 
presidential foreign policy.  The main reason congress [sic] tends, in practice, not to use 
this authority is that congress [sic] rarely wants to.”). 
 83 Waxman, supra note 4, at 422.  For an alternate, though similar, definition, see Herbert S. 
Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 63, 63 (2010) 
(“‘[C]yber attack’ refers to the use of deliberate actions and operations—perhaps over an 
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guidance as to what may constitute a cyberattack, for the purposes of 
applying existing legal structures, the definition must be conceptualized in a 
way that usefully fits into those preexisting regimes.  Because of the 
complexity and great number of potential means of cyberattack, this 
Comment groups such attacks based on employment, i.e., the way in which 
they are utilized and their intended purposes.  Such an approach provides 
greater clarity as to which U.S. domestic legal regime will likely govern their 
employment.  The following section proceeds by first discussing some of the 
technical details of cyberattacks and then moves into understanding how 
they have been—and likely will be—employed in future conflicts. 
Before moving to a discussion of what cyberattacks are, it is important to 
note what they are not.  They are not cyberexploitation, that is, “the use of 
actions and operations . . . to obtain information that would otherwise be 
kept confidential . . . . Cyberexploitations are usually clandestine and 
conducted with the smallest possible intervention that still allows extraction 
of the information sought.”84  The core difference between attack and 
exploitation is in the cyber operation’s purpose; cyberattacks are meant to 
be destructive whereas cyberexploitation acquires information 
nondestructively.85  While the term offensive cyber operations usually 
encompasses both attack and exploitative elements, here “OCO” refers only 
to attacks.86 
At the most basic level, a cyberattack requires three elements:  
vulnerability; access; and payload.87  A vulnerability is “an aspect of the 
system that can be used by the attacker to compromise” an adversary’s 
network.88  Given the increase in the number of complex systems employed 
by countries in the past two decades, many cyber defense analysts and 
computer experts agree that it is increasingly difficult to foresee and prevent 
vulnerability exploitation before attacks.89  Access refers to the ability to 
deliver the payload into the target system such that it exploits the 
vulnerability.  In particular, access to a target depends on whether the attack 
can be launched via remote access (e.g., by hacking into a computer 
network via the internet)90 or close access (e.g., attacking a system through 
 
extended period of time—to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary 
computer systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks.”). 
 84 Lin, supra note 83, at 63. 
 85 Id. at 63–64. 
 86 Id. at 64. 
 87 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 83 (giving a technical account of the 
technology and operational considerations underpinning contemporary cyber-weapons). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 84. 
 90 Id. at 87. 
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the “local installation of hardware” via covert operatives).91  The payload 
describes “the things that can be done once a vulnerability has been 
exploited.  For example, once a software agent (such as a virus) has entered 
a given computer, it can be programmed to do many things—reproducing 
and retransmitting itself, destroying files on the system, or altering files.”92  
Cyberattacks generally target a system’s integrity (i.e., the system’s ability to 
operate normally),93 ability to discern proper authenticity (i.e., the system’s 
ability to determine whether it should accept incoming data),94 or its 
availability (i.e., whether users can properly access the system).95  The 
resulting effects can be wide-ranging, including destroying data on networks, 
generating bogus network traffic, covertly altering data on the network, and 
degrading or denying service on the network.96 
Depending on whether the systems being attacked are remote or close 
access, a number of assault avenues exist.  In an attack on a remote access 
system, botnets are one of the prominent means of assault.97  In a botnet 
attack, which usually aims to deny users access to the system (such as a 
government website in a denial of service or distributed denial of service 
attack), bots install themselves on internet-connected computers and then, 
responding to commands from a master computer, attack the target by 
overloading it with numerous requests for information, such as e-mails, 
sometimes numbering in the millions.98  Because the target cannot 
sufficiently process the information, it becomes inoperative.99  Other ways to 
attack remote access systems include worms and viruses, which are generally 
used to install “trojan horse” systems on many computers that will render 
those computers inoperable.100 
Attacking close access systems may generally be more difficult given their 
lower degree of accessibility.  However, one attack approach involves 
inserting malicious software into the supply chain of a system that will 
eventually become close access.101  Such a strategy allows a compromised 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 88. 
 93 Id. at 111. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 112. 
 96 Lin, supra note 83, at 69–70. 
 97 Scott Berinato, Attack of the Bots, WIRED, Nov. 2006, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.11/botnet.html (detailing how bots conduct 
distributed denial of service attacks). 
 98 Robb, supra note 27. 
 99 For a more in-depth discussion of a bot-net attack, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 70, at 92–96. 
100 Id. at 97. 
101 DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 
TASK FORCE ON MISSION IMPACT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON DOD SOFTWARE 22 (2007), 
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machine or piece of software to enter into the close access system and then 
to be activated at a later point based on a variety of triggering mechanisms.  
Other attack routes include inserting compromised universal serial buses 
(“USBs”) into close systems.  Such an approach can be accomplished either 
by willing or unwilling insiders.102 
Hypothetically, scholars and practitioners have postulated a number of 
ways in which states might use cyberattacks in future combat scenarios, 
depending on a wide range of factors.103  This process of categorization is 
not novel, as U.S. military planners have attempted to produce useful 
typologies since the mid-1990s.104  While many potential categorization 
schemas exist, and many involve different types of adversaries, 
vulnerabilities, technologies underpinning the attacks, etc., most seem to 
focus on a primary element:  the relationship of the cyberattack to other 
operations.  In particular, the schemas differentiate based on whether the 
attack is part of a larger, kinetic offensive, or simply an attack launched 
independently of such operations.  For example, Gregory Rattray and Jason 
Healey, in their recent work, suggest multiple ways in which a state could 
launch such an attack, but underpinning each is a discussion of whether the 
attack is part of a larger military operation or conducted independently.105  
 
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA486949.pdf (“Net-Centric systems 
surely will attract sophisticated adversaries who can subvert the supply chain to replace or 
alter software or hardware, recruiting well-placed insiders and exploiting single-string 
dependencies.”). 
102 Steve Stasiukonis, Social Engineering, the USB Way, DARK READING (June 7, 2006, 4:15 AM), 
http://www.darkreading.com/security/news/208803634/social-engineering-the-usc-
way.html (detailing a social engineering experiment where a cyber expert scattered 
compromised USB drives throughout a parking lot, believing that bank employees would 
use them in the bank’s close system and consequently give him access.  Over 75% of the 
USBs placed in the parking lot were inserted into the bank’s computers). 
103 Gregory Rattray & Jason Healey, Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities 
and Their Use, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING 
CYBERATTACKS:  INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 77, 81–
83 (2010) (suggesting that different types of cyberoperations be broken down based on a 
wide range of factors including:  nature of adversaries, nature of targets, target 
physicality, integration with kinetic operations, scope of the effect, intended duration, 
openness, context, campaign use, initiation responsibility, and rational, initial timing, 
and initiation attack); see also Mike McConnell, Cyber Insecurities:  The 21st Century 
Threatscape, in 2 AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:  SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 25 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp eds., 2011) (detailing how different 
types of adversaries—including non-state actors—would use different methods of 
cyberattack for different results). 
104 U.S. Air Force, Cornerstones of Information Warfare (1997), available at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/usaf/iw/corner.html (describing an early 
attempt to classify different types of information warfare). 
105 Rattray & Healey, supra note 103, at 84–91 (describing how cyberattacks could be utilized, 
inter alia, as a surprise assault on military targets (with kinetic attacks following), in 
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Likewise, William Owens, Kenneth Dam, and Herbert Lin differentiate 
between types of cyberattacks that directly support or are in conjunction 
with military operations,106 and those conducted independently as covert 
action.107 
Further, the distinction between cyberattacks launched independently as 
opposed to part of a larger operation properly characterizes most known 
cyber operations to date.  On the one hand, states have launched a number 
of attacks in recent years independent of kinetic operations.108  For example, 
the actions in Estonia in 2007—though potentially linked to the Russian 
government—were independent of any larger military assault.109  More 
notably, the Stuxnet virus, which inflicted tremendous damage on the 
Iranian nuclear energy program by destroying its centrifuge cascades and 
much of its Uranium enrichment capability, was launched independent of 
military action.110  Though no nation has taken responsibility for the virus, 
most analysts suggest that Israel, with the United States’ help, designed and 
deployed the virus to hinder Iran’s nuclear development.111  On the other 
hand, because cyberattacks may make kinetic operations more effective, 
states have recently employed the two in conjunction.112  For example, the 
alleged Israeli attack on Syria in 2007113—as well as the alleged Russian 
attack on Georgia in 2008114—both employed cyberattacks in conjunction 
with larger operations.  In addition, U.S. war planning for Libya also 
included a cyber component, but only as part of a larger intervention.115 
 
operational support for traditional, kinetic military operations, in support of special 
operations missions, or as stand-alone covert action). 
106 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 177–82. 
107 Id. at 193–98. 
108 Id. 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 25–32. 
110 Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104 (detailing, as 
substantially as possible without access to TS-SCI information, the employment of the 
Stuxnet virus against Iranian Uranium enrichment facilities); see also Sanger, Obama Order 
Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 52; David E. Sanger, Iran Fights 
Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at A4 [hereinafter Sanger, Iran 
Fights Malware Attacking Computers] (detailing Iran’s continued fight to purge the worm 
from its centrifuge control systems); William J. Broad, John Markoff, & David E. Sanger, 
Israel Test Called Crucial In Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1 (examining 
Israel’s preparations when deploying the worm, in particular, establishing a mock set up 
of Iranian nuclear facilities). 
111 Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 52; Broad, 
Markoff, & Sanger, supra note 110. 
112 MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 146–47 (2009) (detailing how cyber 
operation disruption can be effective in conjunction with military operations). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 35–39. 
115 Supra text accompanying note 14. 
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Given the historical record of cyberattacks and that most of the 
theoretical literature categorizes such attacks based on their relationship to 
military actions, this Comment divides the attacks into binary categories:  
attacks waged independently of other military operations, and attacks waged 
as part of a larger military campaign.  Though such a distinction may blur as 
states employ their capabilities in innovative ways, relying on that distinction 
now will aid both in understanding how different U.S. domestic laws apply to 
both general categories and in better preparing legal analysts in case of 
future cyber operations that do not neatly fit into them.  Given this 
distinction, the analysis below examines whether current U.S. law effectively 
governs offensive cyber operations performed in conjunction with a military 
campaign or as a stand-alone operation. 
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:  ARMED FORCES, HOSTILITIES, 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Before proceeding to a discussion of either the War Powers Resolution 
or the Intelligence Authorization Act, one must acknowledge the inherent 
tension built into the relationship between Congress and the President over 
the power to wage war.  Notably, the Constitution splits war-making 
authorities between the congressional and executive branches.116  
Proponents of executive power suggest that, because the President is the 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”117 he is 
vested with the war-making power to determine when and how to deploy 
U.S. armed forces.118  Conversely, Congress has the ability to “declare war,” 
“raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” and “provide for 
calling forth” and organizing and arming the militia.119  Further, based on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, some argue that Congress is empowered 
to pass legislation in accordance with its constitutional war-making authority 
specified above.120  The debate over the extent of each branch’s war-making 
 
116 Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 101 
(1984) (“Anyone wishing to argue that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is 
unconstitutional must be prepared to explain the purpose of article I, section 8, clause 
11, of the Constitution.  That provision expressly grants to Congress the power ‘To 
declare War.’”). 
117 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
118 ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE 
PRESIDENT 7–8 (1982). 
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16. 
120 Patrick D. Robbins, Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years:  A Reassessment, 
38 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 148 (1988) (discussing the different constitutional bases of the 
Congress’s war-making authority). 
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power has shadowed many conflicts in which the United States has been 
involved.121 
The intensity of this debate increased considerably during the Vietnam 
War, when Congress, uncomfortable with Presidents Johnson and Nixon’s 
continuation of the conflict, attempted to rein in presidential power 
through a series of legislative acts.122  The ineffectiveness of these early 
actions led a Senate committee to propose the War Powers Act in 1972.123  
After a period of extensive debates in which the language of the original Act 
was modified,124 the House of Representatives concurred with the Senate bill 
and passed the Resolution on October 12, 1973.125  On November 7, the 
House of Representatives overrode President Nixon’s veto126 of the War 
Powers Resolution.127 
Congress intended the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”)128—passed in 
response to the Vietnam War when Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Nixon deployed large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia without a 
congressional declaration of war—to limit the President’s power to send 
U.S. forces into combat without explicit congressional authorization.129  
However, given inherent questions about its constitutionality,130 
congressional unwillingness to invoke the authority granted to it under the 
 
121 Id. at 150 (“Whatever the Framers’ intent, Presidents in both the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries consistently have tested the limits of their authority to make war.”). 
122 Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law:  Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers 
Resolution, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 736 (1984) (exploring the conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches during the Vietnam war); see generally William B. Spong, 
Jr., Can Balance be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President and Congress?, 6 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Spong Jr., Can Balance be Restored?] (reviewing war 
power proposals by Congress prior to 1972). 
123 S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
124 For an in-depth discussion of this process, see generally William B. Spong Jr., The War 
Powers Resolution Revisited:  Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
823, 823 (1975) [hereinafter Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited] (“Reflecting 
unquestionably the divisiveness caused by the nation’s long involvement in Southeast 
Asia, this legislative activity, which culminated in the enactment of the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 . . . .”). 
125 119 CONG. REC. 33,858–33,873 (1973). 
126 H.R. DOC. NO. 93-171 (1973). 
127 119 CONG. REC. 36,201–36,222 (1973) (284-135 vote to override). 
128 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1541–1548 (2006)) (“It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment 
of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .”). 
129 See Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited:  Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, supra 
note 124, at 824–35; see also Ratner & Cole, supra note 122, at 728–29. 
130 Carter, supra note 116, at 101–02 (debating the constitutional issues undermining the 
War Powers Resolution). 
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WPR under most circumstances,131 and the likelihood that deploying 
offensive cyber activities does not constitute the introduction of armed 
forces into hostilities (if the hostilities threshold is even met),132 the War 
Powers Resolution is a weak footing upon which to base congressional 
oversight of these activities. 
The following section provides an overview of the provisions of the War 
Powers Resolution, paying particular attention to its reporting and 
withdrawal requirements.  It then proceeds to discuss the debates over the 
Resolution’s effectiveness and constitutionality, noting that while it has 
proven ineffective at times, it may not be fatally flawed or unconstitutional.  
Following, this section discusses the definitions of key terms, based both on 
how they have been interpreted in past historical instances of the 
Resolution’s invocation and in the legislative history of the Act.  Finally, this 
section argues that its terms likely do not cover offensive cyber operations 
launched independently or in conjunction with kinetic operations. 
A. A Brief Overview of the War Powers Resolution 
In the absence of congressional declaration of war, the WPR requires 
that: 
[T]he President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
a report, in writing, setting forth—(A) the circumstances necessitating 
the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional 
and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and 
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.133 
Three circumstances trigger this reporting requirement.  If United States 
armed forces are introduced:  (1) “into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances;”134 (2) if such forces are introduced “into the territory, 
airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except 
for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or 
training of such forces;”135 and (3) “in numbers which substantially enlarge 
United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a 
 
131 See generally John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988) (suggesting how Congress could amend the Resolution to 
make it more effective); see also RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:  PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2011) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:  PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE]. 
132 Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–9. 
133 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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foreign nation.”136  Beyond requiring the President to submit a report to 
Congress within forty-eight hours of these specific triggering events, the 
WPR also directs the President to withdraw armed forces within sixty days 
after the report is submitted or is required to be submitted, unless Congress 
has declared war, extended the sixty-day period by law, or is physically 
unable to meet because of an armed attack against the United States.137  The 
President can unilaterally extend this period for an additional thirty days.138  
In another controversial provision of the Act, Congress, by concurrent 
resolution, can order the President to remove U.S. armed forces if they are 
engaged in hostilities outside of the United States without a declaration of 
war or statutory authorization.139  As discussed below, the constitutionality of 
this section (as well as the mandatory sixty-day removal requirement) is 
debatable, as the Supreme Court has ruled that legislative vetoes invalidating 
executive actions—which these sections arguably constitute—are 
unconstitutional.140 
As becomes evident, based on the text of the Resolution, determining 
the definitions of “U.S. armed forces,” “hostilities,” “imminent,” and “into 
the territory . . . while equipped for combat,” is crucial for concluding 
whether the President must report U.S. military activities and remove U.S. 
forces after sixty days.  Before analyzing whether such definitions might 
encompass offensive cyber operations, it is helpful to understand the 
primary arguments against the Act, including the routine assertion by 
Presidents that it is unconstitutional.141 
B. The Alleged Weaknesses of the War Powers Resolution 
Critics of the War Powers Resolution assert two broad critiques:  that it is 
ineffective in practice and that it is unconstitutional.142  Regarding the first 
 
136 Id. 
137 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that 
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional).  See also Process Gas Consumers Group v. 
Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (asserting that the ruling in 
Chadha is meant to be a broad rule and not limited to that case’s particular facts).  But see 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798) (holding that concurrent resolutions do not 
require approval by the President). 
141 GRIMMETT, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:  PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 131, at 2 
(“[E]very President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by 
the Congress on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.”). 
142 For a list of other critiques, see Rostow, supra note 7, at 1–2 (detailing arguments 
suggesting that adherence to the War Powers Resolution would wreck the constitutional 
balance of power and would “restore the Articles of Confederation as our norm for 
 
Jan. 2013] EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY 985 
 
claim, analysts suggest that Presidents simply order operations that 
successfully evade WPR reporting and withdrawal requirements, despite the 
fact that U.S. soldiers are deployed in situations likely imagined by the 
statute’s drafters.143  In particular, administrations continually argue that 
situations into which U.S. troops are deployed do not constitute hostilities.144  
Likewise, some suggest that macro-scale operations of the kind triggering 
the War Powers Resolution—where lengthy troop deployments are followed 
by crises and subsequent war—are antiquated and unlikely to occur in 
contemporary times.145  Other analysts simply claim that Presidents have 
ignored the reporting requirements146 and that members of Congress have 
been unwilling to stand up to potentially popular presidential uses of force, 
even if they clearly violate the WPR.147  As a result, some analysts believe that 
other congressional mechanisms, such as its funding powers, provide the 
body with stronger oversight ability over executive action.148  While many 
have critiqued the War Powers Resolution for its apparent ineffectiveness, 
this does not necessarily suggest it is has been futile; Presidents have actively 
submitted reports pursuant to its requirements and therefore have at least 
provided Congress with information about their activities.149 
 
handling the foreign affairs of the nation, and leave the United States drifting helplessly 
in stormy seas, naked before its enemies”). 
143 Robbins, supra note 120, at 160–73 (suggesting that the President has undertaken limited 
and covert operations, in part, because these can avoid triggering the “hostilities” 
element of the War Powers Resolution).  See also Michael Mandel, Note, A License to Kill:  
America’s Balance of War Powers and the Flaws of the War Powers Resolution, 7 CARDOZO PUB. 
L., POL’Y & ETHICS J., 785, 794–805 (2009) (detailing how the War Powers Resolution has 
been applied to limited- and large-scale troop deployments). 
144 Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–8; see also Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty 
Words”:  A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY. J. (Apr. 
14, 2011, 8:54 AM), http://harvardnsj.org/2011/04/the-cost-of-empty-words-a-comment-
on-the-justice-departments-libya-opinion/ (critiquing the Obama Administration’s view of 
its War Powers duties during the Libya campaign, particularly focusing on the weakness 
of the applicable statutes). 
145 Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart:  Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
17, 20 (1995) (suggesting that, in its current form, the War Powers Resolution is 
ineffective).  The proposition that such large operations are antiquated is dubious, 
however, as the United States deployed large numbers of troops to Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, and after a few months launched a military attack against Iraq. 
146 Id. at 19.  Through 2009, Presidents have submitted one hundred and twenty-seven 
reports pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.  However, only one of these cited the 
4(a)(1) section of the Act, which triggers the sixty-day time limit.  RICHARD GRIMMETT, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41199, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:  AFTER THIRTY-SIX YEARS 
49–69 (2010) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION]. 
147 Id.; see also Ely, supra note 131, at 1384 (“[T]he President has refused to obey the law, and 
Congress has not had the fortitude to call him on it.”). 
148 GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970, supra note 81, at 1. 
149 GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 146, at 49–69. 
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In addition to critiquing its effectiveness, administrations and legal 
analysts have suggested that the WPR is unconstitutional or suffers from 
substantial legal problems.150  These claims break down into four different 
assertions:  that the War Powers Resolution infringes on the President’s 
commander-in-chief function, based on an original understanding of these 
provisions by the Framers;151 that the concurrent resolution constitutes a 
legislative veto of an executive action and is therefore unconstitutional 
under Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha;152 that members of 
Congress do not have standing to bring claims for presidential violations of 
the WPR;153 and that enforcement of the WPR presents a non-justiciable 
claim.154 
While each of these claims has merit, none is sufficiently definitive as to 
whether the Resolution is constitutional or suffers from other fatal legal 
flaws.  First, good evidence exists to support arguments that the Framers 
would have found the Resolution to be consistent with congressional war 
powers,155 or conversely, that it infringes upon the Executive’s commander-
in-chief function.156 
Second, the War Powers Resolution may not constitute a “legislative 
veto” for the purposes of Chadha.157  According to legal scholars, “[t]he 
 
150 See generally Carter, supra note 116.  Interestingly, the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S. 
Department of Justice has, at times, argued that the War Powers Resolution is 
constitutional.  Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory 
Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1980) (“We believe that Congress may, as a 
general constitutional matter, place a 60-day limit on the use of our armed forces as 
required by . . . the Resolution . . . .  We cannot say that placing that burden on the 
President unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.”). 
151 Carter, supra note 116, at 111 (“[The] evidence concerning the original understanding 
[of whether the War Powers Resolution would violate the executive’s commander-in-chief 
function]—if one indeed chooses to put any faith in that means of constitutional 
adjudication—does not come down firmly on one side or the other.”). 
152 Id. at 129–33. 
153 See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR POWERS 
LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF THE WAR 
POWERS RESOLUTION (2012) (providing a case-by-case overview of the different actions 
taken by Congress members to force the President to abide by the War Powers 
Resolution). 
154 Id. at 1. 
155 See, e.g., ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 
(1976); Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972); Thomas F. 
Eagleton, The August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 18 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 
(1973). 
156 See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law:  The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 
833 (1972) [hereinafter Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law]; J. Terry Emerson, The War 
Powers Resolution Tested:  The President’s Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
187 (1975). 
157 G. Sidney Buchanan, In Defense of The War Powers Resolution:  Chadha Does Not Apply, 22 
HOUS. L. REV. 1155, 1155 n.4 (1985) (suggesting that a legislative veto is “a provision by 
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Chadha decision is generally believed to have struck down section 5(c) of the 
War Powers Resolution, which permits the Congress to direct the President 
to remove the armed from a hostile situation by passage of a concurrent 
resolution.”158  In addition, some argue that Section 5(b) (requiring the 
removal of troops after the mandatory sixty-day period without 
congressional action, i.e., if only one chamber of Congress does not act) also 
represents a legislative veto.159  In Chadha, the Supreme Court ruled that 
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed Congress 
to pass a joint resolution forcing the Attorney General to cancel a 
deportation, was unconstitutional because it was a legislative veto of 
executive action.160  Basing its decision on Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 
3 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that congressional 
action meant to have the effect of law must be approved by both houses of 
Congress and presented to the President for his approval (or disapproval).161  
In Chadha, “the Court held that § 244(c)(2) [was] unconstitutional because 
it authorized one house of Congress to change the legal status quo by action 
less than that required by the Constitution for a valid law.”162  As noted by 
Professor Sidney Buchanan however, substantial distinctions exist between 
§ 244(c)(2) and the War Powers Resolution.  For example, § 244(c)(2) 
allowed Congress to change the legal status quo by adjusting the legal status 
of the immigrant.163  If, as some scholars argue, the War Powers Resolution is 
a codification of legally existing congressional war-making authority, then 
the War Powers Resolution does not change the legal status quo but merely 
fleshes out these powers.164  Further, though scholars note that the War 
Powers Resolution may be unconstitutional because the action (of forcing 
the removal of troops) is not presented to the President for his approval, 
such presentment may not be required.165  In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the 
Supreme Court suggested that the presentment requirement applies only to 
 
which Congress reserves to itself a power to affect, by later action less than a law, authority 
that it has previously delegated to some other agency or branch of government, typically 
to the executive branch or to an administrative agency exercising quasi-legislative, rule-
making authority”). 
158 Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 
17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 777 (1984). 
159 Id. at 782–93. 
160 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983).  For a 
discussion of the facts of Chadha and the lower courts’ decisions, see Buchanan, supra 
note 157, at 1170–73. 
161 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–48. 
162 Buchanan, supra note 157, at 1174. 
163 Id. at 1177.  For a discussion of other distinctions, see id. at 1177–79. 
164 Id. 
165 Carter, supra note 116, at 130. 
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“ordinary” cases of legislation.166  This assertion implies that there may exist 
cases where legislation does not require presentment before the President 
and it is likely that a concurrent resolution in the War Powers Resolution 
would be extraordinary enough to fall into such a category.167  As a result, it 
is unclear whether the War Powers Resolution represents an impermissible 
legislative veto. 
Third, courts have suggested that members of Congress may have 
standing to bring suit based on violations of the War Powers Resolution.168  
Federal courts have suggested that, if Congress were to pass a resolution 
requiring a particular presidential report under the War Powers Resolution, 
for example, non-compliance with this resolution would constitute a 
cognizable claim.169  As a result, Congress could potentially use the courts to 
bring a successful claim for violation of the War Powers Resolution. 
Fourth and finally, some federal courts have asserted that the issue of 
whether the President refuses to abide by the War Powers Resolution is a 
political, non-justiciable question, and therefore the courts cannot rule on 
the matter.170  At the same time, however, courts have also asserted that if a 
majority of Congress agreed that the President must abide by the 
requirements of the War Powers Resolution in a given circumstance, such 
consensus would present a justiciable claim to the courts.171 
As this discussion illustrates, the War Powers Resolution is certainly 
flawed.  However, it is not necessarily unconstitutional and may serve some 
 
166 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 381 n.* (1798) (“The negative of the President 
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation:  He has nothing to do with the 
proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.”). 
167 For this argument, see Carter, supra note 116, at 130–33. 
168 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147–48 (D.D.C. 1990); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. 
Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(“[W]ere Congress to pass a resolution to the effect that a report was required under the 
WPR, or to the effect that the forces should be withdrawn, and the President disregarded 
it, a constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented.”). 
169 Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 899; see also Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987), 
aff’d, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting that if Congress enacted legislation to 
enforce the Resolution and the President ignored it, “a question ripe for judicial review” 
would be presented); see also GARCIA, supra note 153. 
170 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 770 F.2d 202 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to rule on whether the Reagan administration’s actions 
triggered the War Powers Resolution because it presented a “nonjusticiable political 
question”); see also Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d 
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (asserting that War Powers Resolution enforcement was a political, 
not a judicial, question).  But see Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 n.5 (D.D.C. 
1999), aff’d, 203 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (suggesting that not every violation of the 
statute constituted a political question). 
171 Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1150–51 (holding that an injunction could be issued and the 
President could be made to comply with the War Powers Resolution if there were 
congressional consensus on the issue). 
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positive function by alerting Congress to activities undertaken by the 
President and giving them the potential opportunity to weigh in, albeit not 
likely force the removal of U.S. forces.  Thus, it still may prove useful in 
helping Congress regulate the use of offensive cyber operations, if it applies 
to them. 
C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations 
As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers 
Resolution—especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation—are 
the definitions of key terms, particularly “armed forces,” as the relevant 
provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President “introduc[es armed 
forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,”172 or if 
such forces are introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign 
nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate 
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.”173  The 
requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed 
forces “in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces 
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.”174  As is evident, 
the definition of “armed forces” is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR 
applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over 
executive actions.  The definition of “hostilities,” which has garnered the 
majority of scholarly and political attention,175 particularly in the recent 
Libyan conflict,176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes 
important if “armed forces” exist in the situation. 
As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative 
history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 
 
172 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., War Powers:  A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of 
Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Int’l Sec. and Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 38–39 (1975) 
(letter from State Dep’t Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh & Dep’t of Def. Gen. Counsel 
Martin R. Hoffmann to Chairman Clement J. Zablocki) [hereinafter Leigh & Hoffman] 
(defining “hostilities” “to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are 
actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces . . . .”). 
176 Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
177 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which 
meaning is [] most in accord with context and ordinary usage . . . .”). 
178 United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226–44 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (illustrating how judges examine legislative history when 
interpreting statutes). 
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“armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not 
weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons.  Section 
1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term 
‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of 
members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the 
movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any 
foreign country or government.”180  While this definition pertains to the 
broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that 
only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition 
under the WPR.  Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a 
human individual who is part of an organization.181  Thus, it appears that the 
term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed 
forces.  However, there exist two potential complications with this reading.  
First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of 
United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such 
armed forces.”182  By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary—
language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more 
than members.  This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core 
principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression 
of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-
members constituting armed forces).183  Second, the term “member” does 
not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual 
units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members 
of a pack).  As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces” 
refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not 
determinative. 
An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress 
clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed 
forces.  For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around 
who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted 
a member.  Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects, 
proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution 
cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central 
 
179 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar 
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”). 
180 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2006). 
181 See, e.g., Member, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/member?s=ts 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (defining a “member” as a “person . . . that is part of a society, 
party, community, taxon, or other body”). 
182 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2006) (emphasis added). 
183 See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28–29 (2001). 
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Intelligence Agency).184  This amendment was dropped after encountering 
pushback,185 but the debate revolved around whether those military 
individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed 
forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the 
term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces.  Further, during the 
congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces” 
centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,186 
suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S. 
combat troops. 
The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale 
but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities.187  While 
examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon 
only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further 
support for those two alternate interpretive sources.188  As one scholar has 
noted, “[t]he War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with 
sending U.S. troops into harm’s way.”189  The historical context of the War 
Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the 
resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the 
passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to 
effectively regulate the President’s deployments of large numbers of U.S. 
troops to Southeast Asia,190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing 
troop incursions into countries in that region.191  The WPR was a reaction to 
the President’s continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, 
and as such suggests that Congress’s broad purpose was to prevent the 
unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities. 
This analysis suggests that, when defining the term “armed forces,” 
Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in 
 
184 Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited, supra note 124, at 831. 
185 Id. 
186 Congress, the President, and the War Powers:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. Policy 
and Scientific Developments of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 124–31 (1970) 
[hereinafter Congress, the President, and the War Powers] (statement of John Norton Moore, 
Professor of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law). 
187 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006). 
188 YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL 
PRINCIPALS AND RECENT TRENDS, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (2008) (“[T]he Court has begun to 
place more emphasis on statutory text and less emphasis on legislative history and other 
sources ‘extrinsic’ to that text.  More often than before, statutory text is the ending point 
as well as the starting point for interpretation.”). 
189 Dycus, supra note 76, at 162. 
190 See, e.g., Ratner & Cole, supra note 122, at 736. 
191 Congress, the President, and the War Powers, supra note 186, at 124–31, 124 (statement of 
John Norton Moore, Professor of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law) 
(discussing congressional proposals to define the authority of the President to intervene 
abroad without congressional consent). 
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harm’s way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities).  Applied to 
offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the 
War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities.  Worms, viruses, 
and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops.  Therefore, the key question 
regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the 
operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military 
operation.  Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism.  For 
example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an 
activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, 
could trigger the WPR.  This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons.  First, 
it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not 
participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed 
forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution.192  Thus, individual 
operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not 
constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.  
Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely.  If the target system is 
remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm’s 
way.193  If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target 
such systems.194  As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities 
or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities—which is 
highly unlikely—such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution. 
IV. THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT:  COVERT ACTIONS 
AND THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES EXEMPTION 
Stemming from similar tension noted in the constitutional division of 
war-making authority noted above, congressional oversight of covert actions 
beyond intelligence collection has often proved a point of contention 
between the executive and legislative branches.195  Presidents have “inferred 
authority [to conduct covert actions] from such places as the Vesting Clause, 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the Treaty Clause, and from an implied 
executive privilege.”196 
 
192 127 CONG. REC. 3743 (1981) (asserting that the hostility requirement is not triggered if 
personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany . . . forces in combat, 
on operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is likely”); see also Leigh & 
Hoffman, supra note 175 at 38–40. 
193 See notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
194 See notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
195 See generally A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 485, 
517–37 (2009) (detailing the development since 1947 of the congressional legal actions 
meant to limit executive covert actions). 
196 Id. at 517. 
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Likewise, Congress attempted to rein in the President’s ability to conduct 
covert operations without oversight by implementing a series of laws that 
required the President to get approval before undertaking such activities.197  
If the President did not provide such notification, Congress could decline to 
fund that particular covert activity.198  Following the revelation that 
widespread, unreported covert actions were undertaken during the Vietnam 
War, Congress moved for stricter control of executive power, both by forcing 
the executive to account for the money it was spending as part of annual 
authorization bills199 and by streamlining its own oversight capability by 
tasking two primary committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with 
oversight.200 
While Congress designed this legislation to rein in the President’s power 
to conduct covert activities without oversight, events in the 1980s clearly 
showed that its efforts had been ineffective.201  In particular, the Iran-Contra 
affair illustrated that Congress needed to substantially reform oversight 
legislation to ensure that it could properly monitor executive covert 
action.202  As a result, in 1990, Congress began drafting a new oversight bill, 
 
197 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Hughes-Ryan Act), Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, § 662, 88 
Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976)), repealed by 
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429.  The 
Hughes-Ryan Act, as amended, provided: 
No funds appropriated under the authority of this chapter or any other Act may 
be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in 
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary 
intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is 
important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely 
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees 
of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United 
States Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the United States 
House of Representatives. 
  Id. 
198 Rasdan, supra note 195, at 522.  (“Congress, by receiving notice of covert actions, could 
try to block an action it deemed inappropriate by denying funds to carry out the 
action.”). 
199 Marshall Silverberg, The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA’s Covert Operations, 68 
TEX L. REV. 575, 596 (1990) (“This Act for the first time placed the CIA and the other 
intelligence agencies under congressional authorization and appropriation 
procedures.”). 
200 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407(a), 
§ 407(b)(1), § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 413 (2000)); see also Rasdan, supra note 195, at 525–27. 
201 Indeed, Congress itself remarked, in legislation meant to remedy its oversight failures 
associated with Iran-Contra, that “[u]nder current law . . . the Congressional mandate is 
ambiguous, confusing and incomplete. . . . The statutory requirements for informing the 
intelligence committees of covert actions are subject to misinterpretation, and the scope 
of activities covered by the law is undefined.”  S. REP. NO. 102-85, § 503, at 34 (1991). 
202 See generally Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair, 
S. REP. NO. 100-216 (1987), H.R. REP. NO. 100-433 (1987) (detailing the Iran-Contra 
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the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, which grants Congress oversight 
of covert activities.203  Section 413b of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
provides, 
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive 
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive 
matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all 
departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government 
involved in a covert action . . . shall keep the [congressional] intelligence 
committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions . . . .204 
The Act further provides that the President must ensure that any covert 
action that falls under the scope of the Act is reported to Congress “as soon 
as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert 
action”205 unless “the President determines that it is essential to limit access 
to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of 
the United States.”206  Moreover, if the President does not fully inform the 
intelligence committees prior to the action, he or she “shall fully inform the 
[congressional] intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall 
provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.”207 
Congress, recognizing that the power of the statute turned—to a 
substantial degree—on the definition of covert action, provided guidance 
both in the legislation and the committee reports as to what the term meant.  
According to the statute, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or 
activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, 
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly.”208  Congress also provided a list of exceptions to the term, 
however, specifically noting that, inter alia, “activities the primary purpose of 
which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, 
 
scandal and resulting investigation); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always 
Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988) 
[hereinafter Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs] (arguing that the 
Iran-Contra Affair was symbolic of the inadequacies of America’s foreign affairs policies). 
203 50 U.S.C. §§ 413b(c)(2), 413b(d) (2006). 
204 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b) (2006). 
205 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c) (2006). 
206 Id. 
207 Id.  Interestingly, President George H.W. Bush, when signing the bill, suggested that 
“timely fashion” did not mean within forty-eight hours, as specified in the Act.  Rather, he 
suggested that “[i]n those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate 
that notice will be provided within a few days.  Any withholding beyond this period would 
be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the Constitution.”  
Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1609, 1611 (Nov. 30, 1989). 
208 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006). 
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traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of 
United States Government programs, or administrative activities,” as well as 
“traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such 
activities,” do not constitute covert action.209 
While an initial textual reading of these exceptions—especially 
traditional military activities (“TMAs”)—suggests that they are extremely 
broad, an examination of the Act’s legislative history suggests that they are 
narrower than they first appear.  In particular, as University of Texas law 
professor Robert Chesney notes, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence’s (“SSCI”) committee report associated with the legislation, 
went on to make clear that the SSCI assumed that U.S. government 
responsibility ‘would be apparent or acknowledged at the time of the 
military operation.’  When that was not the case—i.e. when “military 
elements not identifiable to the United States [are] used to carry out an 
operation abroad without ever being acknowledged by the United 
States”—the operation would not constitute TMA.210 
This original understanding led to an odd result, whereby “the TMA 
exemption did no work, as the definition of covert action already excluded 
operations in which the U.S. role was intended to be acknowledged.”211  To 
remedy this issue, the committees proposed, and President Bush ultimately 
accepted,212 a compromise whereby an unacknowledged operation could fall 
under the traditional military activities exemption by meeting two 
requirements:213  first, the TMA must be commanded and executed by 
military personnel; and second, the TMA must take place in a context in 
which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval 
has been given by the National Command Authority (which consists of the 
President and the Secretary of Defense) for the activities and for the 
operational planning for hostilities.214  Further, according to Chesney, 
“[o]perational planning can and normally will begin far earlier than the eve 
of conflict or even the eve of a deployment in anticipation of combat. . . . 
[T]he ‘operational planning’ standard . . . is not nearly as restrictive . . . as 
the casual reader might assume.”215 
 
209 Id. 
210 Chesney, supra note 76, at 595. 
211 Id. at 595–96. 
212 Id. at 600–01. 
213 Id. at 598–99. 
214 S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991). 
215 Chesney, supra note 76, at 599–600. 
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A. The Intelligence Authorization Act as Applied to Offensive Cyber 
Operations 
Given the language of the statute and the elaboration on its language 
provided by the legislative history, would offensive cyber operations—either 
used independently or in conjunction with a military campaign—trigger the 
notification requirements of the Intelligence Authorization Act?  Looking 
first at cyber operations used prior to—or in conjunction with—military 
campaigns, the President would not need to report these to Congress under 
§ 413b.  Interestingly, depending on how the United States decides to 
conduct its offensive cyber operations, they may not even constitute covert 
actions under 413b, before even reaching the question of whether they fall 
under the exemptions.  The statute’s definition of covert actions requires 
that the United States not intend its role be “apparent or acknowledged 
publicly.”216  If, for example, the United States were to launch an attack 
using proxy forces—similar to the alleged Russian attack against Georgia in 
the 2008 war—it would likely constitute a covert action because the United 
States would be attempting to hide its role.  Conversely, in the Israeli case, 
Israel likely did not intend for its computer attack against Syrian air defenses 
to remain hidden; indeed, by the overall attack’s public nature, it seemed 
likely that information about the cyberattack preceding the military strike 
would be revealed.  Likewise, if the United States in the lead-up to the Libya 
intervention had launched a cyberattack against the Libyan air defense 
network, it might also have failed to constitute covert action because of the 
likelihood that the third party observers would understand that a cyberattack 
occurred.  Further, in the Israeli case and the Libya hypothetical, Israel and 
the United States clearly did not intend to hide their roles, as they followed 
the cyberattacks (or considered attacks) by openly striking targets within 
those countries. 
If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was 
part of a larger military operation, such an attack would likely fall into the 
“traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such 
activities” exception provided in the statute.217  To qualify as a traditional 
military activity, the TMA must be commanded and executed by military 
personnel and take place in a context in which overt hostilities are either 
ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval has been given by the National 
Command Authority for the activities and for the operational planning for 
hostilities.218  Given that the National Security Agency, responsible for the 
development and deployment of U.S. cyber capabilities, is co-housed and 
 
216 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000). 
217 Id. 
218 S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991). 
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extensively shares personnel with U.S. Cyber Command, the military 
command tasked with launching cyberattacks against adversaries, it seems 
likely that any such attack will satisfy the first prong of the test.219 
Regarding the second prong, cyber operations conducted prior to, or in 
conjunction with, military operations may also take place in a context in 
which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated.  First, using the 
Russian activities in the 2008 war with Georgia as the basis for a factual 
hypothetical, if the United States were to conduct similar operations parallel 
to kinetic operations, such activity would be taking place in the context of 
overt hostilities.  Though the level of hostilities is important in determining 
whether “overt hostilities” exist,220 a Georgian-style conflict would likely 
trigger this exception.221  Though one might argue, as the Obama 
administration did in the 2011 Libyan intervention, that its actions did not 
constitute hostilities (and therefore did not trigger the War Powers 
Resolution’s reporting requirement), that argument does not hold force 
here because the Obama Administration was referring to the period after 
United States airmen were engaging in direct strikes against Libyan ground 
forces (and after all of Libya’s air defenses were effectively destroyed).222  By 
inference, the period in which U.S. forces were striking Libyan targets did 
constitute hostilities.  Therefore, these cyber operations, used in 
conjunction with military operations, would likely fall under the TMA 
exception. 
If the cyberattacks were used prior to the commencement of hostilities 
(for example if the United States launched OCOs to disable Libya’s air 
defense network), they would also likely fall under the language of the 
exception because the National Command Authority would have given 
approval both for the activities and operational planning for the hostilities.  
While this might seem like a high burden, National Command Authority 
consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense.223  Thus the 
 
219 Chesney, supra note 76, at 581 (“CYBERCOM and NSA are co-located at Fort Meade, they 
share some personnel (many of whom are trained in procedures meant to preserve a 
distinction between their actions as CYBERCOM personnel and their potentially-identical 
actions wearing their hats as NSA personnel), and both are (and must be) headed by the 
same official (currently General Keith Alexander).”). 
220 See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
221 Roger N. McDermott, Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War, PARAMETERS, 
Spring 2009, at 65–67 (providing a short overview of the military elements of Russia’s 
attack on Georgia). 
222 Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–9 (“The situation in Libya does not constitute a war 
requiring specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause of the 
Constitution.”). 
223 Dep’t of Def., Directive Number 5100.30, § 3.1 (Dec. 2, 1971) (“The NCA consists only of 
the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or 
successors.”). 
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President and the Secretary of Defense must only approve the activities in 
anticipation of overt hostilities.  Further, because operational planning can 
simply constitute planning for a “situation that likely would involve military 
forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, 
military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the 
President or SecDef,”224 National Command Authority for operational 
planning does not require the President and the Secretary of Defense to 
prepare to commence overt hostilities, but rather they can simply conduct 
contingency planning for a wide range of scenarios.  Further, in a 
circumstance where the United States is prepared to actively intervene in 
another country, such as Libya, it would be clear that overt hostilities are 
anticipated, even in circumstances where overt hostilities are not imminent.  
In such a scenario, the President is merely considering future action and 
planning accordingly, and thus such offensive cyber operations would likely 
fall under the Traditional Military Activities exception. 
Offensive cyber operations might also be exempt under the routine 
support exception.  If the activity is “routine support” to “traditional 
diplomatic or military activities,” it does not constitute covert action.225  
Though the legislation does not define “routine,” the Senate committee 
suggested it involved a subjective element and that providing pertinent 
examples might be useful.226  According to the committee, the term “would 
include various forms of logistical support that might be useful in placing 
personnel inside a denied area and enabling them to act without detection, 
including false documents, communications gear, safe houses, 
transportation, and information.”227  Interestingly, these examples seem to 
reference support to covert activities, not necessarily traditional military 
activities (i.e. helping to facilitate individuals to act without detection).  
However, if these activities are meant to support traditional military 
activities, then the language seems likely to encompass cyberattacks in 
preparation for military attacks against a target.  For example, if the United 
States had launched OCOs against Libya to disable its air defense network in 
preparation of an allied air attack, this might be similar to aiding personnel 
in gaining access to a denied area (in this case, the personnel would be U.S. 
aircraft and the associated crewmen and the denied area would be airspace 
denied because of the defenses protecting it).  While ambiguity certainly 
exists as to whether such a cyber operation would constitute routine support, 
 
224 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Operational Planning, JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0, Aug. 11, 2011, at 
xvii–xviii. 
225 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006). 
226 Chesney, supra note 76, at 596.  See also S. REP. NO. 101-358, at 54 (1990) (providing 
examples of what the Committee would regard as “routine support”). 
227 Chesney, supra note 76, at 596. 
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offensive cyber operations conducted prior to—or in conjunction with—
kinetic operations likely do fall under the covert action exemption. 
Likewise, offensive cyber operations conducted independently of military 
operations, though likely constituting covert action, are also likely exempt 
under the Traditional Military Activities exception.  Imagine, for example, 
that the United States launched the Stuxnet worm that attacked Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment capabilities without Israeli involvement.  Further 
imagine that all other facts in the case were the same as they are in reality 
(i.e. the United States denied its involvement in the attack).  In such a case, 
the attack seems to constitute a covert action that requires reporting to the 
congressional intelligence committees because it was an activity to influence 
political conditions (i.e. the Iranian ability or decision to develop its nuclear 
program) or military conditions (i.e. preventing the Iranians from moving 
forward with the development of a nuclear weapon, which could 
substantially bolster their military capability) abroad.228  Further, the United 
States did not intend for its role to be apparent or publicly acknowledged.229 
Despite falling into this category, however, such an offensive operation, 
for the reasons discussed above, likely satisfies the congressional test for a 
traditional military activity.  First, because General Alexander is the 
commander of both CYBERCOM and the head of the National Security 
Agency and because many of the personnel are dual-hatted at the respective 
organizations, any offensive cyber operation conducted independently of a 
kinetic assault will be commanded and executed by military personnel.230  
Second, because the President can launch offensive cyber operations 
without congressional notification if they are in anticipation of hostilities,231 
he also has great flexibility in deciding whether to report his activities.  For 
example, if the President were to order the launch of a Stuxnet-style attack 
against Iran to degrade its nuclear enrichment capability, such an activity 
would—assuming it was done with the Secretary of Defense’s consent—
necessarily constitute approval by the National Command Authority.  In 
addition, because the definition of operational planning—another element 
required in fulfilling the TMA exception to the definition of covert action—
is so broad, such an attack would likely fall within its purview.  The President 
would simply argue that approval has been given for operational planning of 
future combat operations with Iran (which it almost certainly has in the U.S. 
military)232 and therefore the activity was taking place in the context where 
 
228 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006). 
229 Id. 
230 S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991). 
231 Id. 
232 See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Annie Lowrey, Iran Threatens to Block Oil Shipments, as U.S. 
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overt hostilities are anticipated.  Indeed, only in a situation where no 
contingency planning has occurred—such as with an ally or a country that 
the United States takes little interest—would this exception not apply. 
As a result, it becomes evident that even a Stuxnet-type of attack likely 
will not trigger the requirements set forth in the Intelligence Authorization 
Act.  Given the dual-hatted nature of many NSA and CYBERCOM personnel, 
as well as the fact that action approved by the President and the Secretary of 
Defense necessarily constitutes approval by the National Command 
Authority, all the executive branch must realistically show is that it 
undertook the operation in a context where operational planning had 
occurred for potential hostilities at some undefined point in the future.  
This hurdle is very low and the executive should have little problem clearing 
it. 
These limited requirements suggest that the executive can easily argue 
that offensive cyber operations conducted both as independent actions and 
in conjunction with kinetic operations likely fall under the Traditional 
Military Activity exception to the definition of covert action as provided by 
the Intelligence Authorization Act.  As a result, the President is likely not 
statutorily required to report any offensive cyberattacks under the Act. 
V.  A MIDDLE GROUND OF LEGAL OVERSIGHT 
This analysis suggests that, given inherent weaknesses in the underlying 
statutory schemes, excluding offensive cyber operations from their scope 
does not substantially shift the balance of war-making authority between the 
President and Congress.  This exclusion does, however, provide the 
President additional, powerful means by which to conduct military action 
without congressional oversight. 
Based on analysis of the War Powers Resolution, the lack of oversight for 
OCOs does not radically shift the balance between the legislative and 
executive branches’ war-making authority.  Most notably, because the War 
Powers Resolution itself has proven ineffective in providing Congress with a 
powerful tool to govern presidential use of force, bringing OCOs under the 
War Powers Resolution’s statutory umbrella likely would not provide the 
possibility of such oversight.  However, insofar as the President has 
increasingly turned to covert action since the passage of the War Powers 
Resolution to avoid its reporting requirements,233 offensive cyber operations 
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provide the President another means by which to continue this trend.  
OCOs therefore may give the President substantially more flexibility than he 
already has under the War Powers Resolution by adding what will become an 
increasingly frequent tool of warfare to his option-set. 
The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under 
the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the 
balance between congressional and executive war-making powers.  The 
reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself:  the Intelligence 
Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the 
non-use or withdrawal of forces.234  Further, these reports must be made in a 
“timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small 
number of Congressmen (at most eight).235  Thus even if the President had 
to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have 
to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports 
would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be 
able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other 
members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of 
these capabilities.  The resulting picture is one of increased presidential 
flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization 
Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased 
congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop 
deployments and covert actions.  Yet these statutes do not cover offensive 
cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign 
policy tool outside congressional reach. 
Should these statutes be adjusted (or new ones created) that give 
Congress additional oversight in this area?  Two competing desiderata 
suggest that oversight should be increased, but only to a limited extent.  On 
the one hand, policymakers have suggested that developing strict rules and 
limitations on the use of offensive cyber operations will handicap the 
military’s ability to quickly and effectively employ these tools in critical 
situations, such as cyber warfare against adversarial states.236  According to 
these arguments, developing red lines that proscribe the use of these 
capabilities will create reluctance and trepidation among strategists and will 
lead to disadvantages in combat situations.237  On the other hand, 
developing some legal rules is necessary to ensure that, as these cyber 
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capabilities continue to develop, the President does not gain sufficient 
leverage to substantially tilt the balance between the President and 
Congress.  Moreover, because these capabilities are still developing at a fast 
rate, understanding how they should and should not be employed is an 
important goal and having senior members of Congress and their staffs—
professional staff members on the intelligence committees, who likely have 
substantial experience in these areas—provide input would be useful in 
developing this understanding. 
These competing arguments—one for limiting any oversight and one for 
increasing it—suggest a middle ground that will avoid drawing red lines but 
will still provide useful congressional insight into the doctrinal and legal 
development of offensive cyber operations.  Such an approach would 
include new legislation, similar to the Intelligence Authorization Act, 
explicitly requiring the President to report its use of covert cyber activities to 
the heads of Senate and House intelligence committees (i.e. the Gang of 
Eight).238  Congress would not have the ability to veto such actions, however 
it would be able to raise potential legal issues with the executive branch, as 
well as provide policy advice as to the wisdom of employing these capabilities 
in such circumstances.  As a result, while the heads of these committees 
would not have the ability to draw red lines themselves, they would be able 
to consult with the executive branch—as the branch employs these 
capabilities—to determine their likely legality and wisdom.  While the 
President could ignore this advice, such an approach would at the very least 
keep Congress informed of the developing capabilities and their 
employment.  With such an approach, Congress could play a meaningful 
role in the shifting and uncertain legal and policy realms of offensive cyber 
operations, which will undoubtedly become increasingly important as the 
United States and other nations develop and employ these capabilities with 
ever-greater frequency. 
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